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Like John Major before him, David Cameron has pragmatically
managed his party’s dissensions over Europe without
addressing their fundamental sources.
by Blog Admin
Much as it did for his predecessors in the 1980s and 1990s, the “Europe Problem” has caused
headaches for UK Prime Minister, David Cameron. While some have commented that
Cameron has been more flexible on these issues than some of his predecessors, Simon
Usherwood disagrees. He argues that David Cameron, just like John Major before him, has
been unwilling to address the fundamental sources of the Conservative Party’s split over
Europe.
In her recent EUROPP article, Françoise Boucek discusses how David Cameron appears to
have learnt lessons f rom the 1980s and 1990s about how to manage the European issue within the Brit ish
Conservative party. Her argument is that rather than standing f irm (in the model of  John Major), Cameron
has been much more f lexible in shif t ing f ocus around and in ref raming issues. Undoubtedly, the European
issue has – more than any other – caused considerable pain to the Tories in recent decades, and Boucek
argues that the prof ound lack of  unity within the party contributed to their long period out of  of f ice
between 1997 and 2010.
However, it is important to recognise that both in practice and
in success, Cameron’s approach is not so very dif f erent f rom
Major ’s. If  Thatcher was central to turning European
integration into a live polit ical issue during her premiership, it
was only really with her removal f rom of f ice in 1990 that it
gained its vehemence: f or many Thatcherites in the party, it
was the association between her ousting and the UK’s
membership of  the European Exchange Rate Membership
(ERM) which conf irmed their suspicions.
Despite this, Major was able to engage in a relatively posit ive
European policy in the period through to the 1992 general
election. He worked through the Maastricht negotiations with
a large degree of  f lexibility, hampered more by lingering
suspicion of  Brit ish intentions than anything else: certainly,
his resolution of  the EMU and social chapter discussions,
balanced with a strengthening of  the ECJ and other elements,
appeared to satisf y the large majority of  his party at the time.
What was to undermine this was the surprise of  the 1992
election, with its very small majority f or Major. At a stroke, this
gave sceptics a powerf ul lever to apply pressure, especially in
the f ace of  a tactically complicit Labour party. The debacle of
Black Wednesday, when the UK crashed out of  ERM, and the bitter f ight over Maastricht ratif ication, both
poisoned the issue f or all involved and required Major to seek compromises where possible. Hence the
vetoing of  Jean-Luc Dehaene as Commission President in 1994, the Ioannina compromise of  the same
year, and the very strong reaction to the BSE beef  ban f rom 1996. All of  these were essentially symbolic
compromises on his underlying posit ion. All of  Major ’s successors as party leader, up until Cameron,
f loundered on the issue of  the EU, albeit in dif f erent ways, but similarly in that they did not try to put it to
one side, most obviously with William Hague trying to save the pound. The main consequence was to allow
the party to undergo a generational shif t towards scepticism.
As Boucek notes, Cameron wanted the Tories to ‘stop banging on about Europe’: i.e. ignore it, or at least
not discuss it in public. Much like Major bef ore him, Cameron’s posit ion on the EU is best characterised as
one of  management, rather than hard-wired principle. Both could reasonably be described as pragmatists
on the issue. Thus we saw Cameron expounding no f irm policy on matters European except the movement
of  the European Conservatives and Ref ormists group out of  the European People’s Party (EPP) af ter the
2009 European Parliament elections, a move that still looks deeply questionable in terms of  inf luence and
stability. Likewise in the 2010 general election, there was litt le beyond the commitment to a ref erendum on
the Lisbontreaty ‘if  still active’, which (he decided) it was not. This echoes Major ’s commitment to a vote on
the single currency in 1997, in large part predicated on the small chance of  winning that election. Even the
current activity on various f ronts is not about closing down engagement with the EU: the Review of  the
Balance of  Competences is simply a mapping exercise, not a cost-benef it one; the muttering about the
Financial Perspectives is par f or the course.
The two obvious points where we might challenge this are the Europe Act and the Fiscal Compact
negotiations late last year. The f ormer can be seen as a miscalculation on the part of  Cameron, who
(reasonably enough) thought that treaty ref orm was a distant prospect in 2010; much as the French
commitment to a ref erendum on enlargement was a tactical move, so too was this. Similarly, the latter was a
misstep, as evidenced by the rapid re-engagement of  Brit ish of f icials in the negotiations af ter the
December 2011 European Council.
In short, Cameron has been no dif f erent to Major. Both have taken opportunit ies where possible. Both have
tried to def lect pressure: Major with his leadership vote, Cameron with his movement towards a ref erendum.
But both are/were essentially committed to Brit ish membership of  the Union: both have seen considerable
expansions in EU competence (just as Thatcher did bef ore them). Moreover, both have shown an
unwillingness to address the f undamental sources of  the internal split, and that is why we are still having
the same conversations that we were twenty years ago.
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